Martin-L of's type theory is presented in several steps. The kernel is a dependently typed -calculus. Then there are schemata for inductive sets and families of sets and for primitive recursive functions and families of functions. Finally, there are set formers (generic polymorphism) and universes. At each step syntax, inference rules, and set-theoretic semantics are given.
Introduction
Usually Martin-L of's type theory is presented as a closed system with rules for a nite collection of set formers. But it is also often pointed out that the system is in principle open to extension: we may introduce new sets when there is a need for them. The principle is that a set is by de nition inductively generated -it is de ned by its introduction rules, which are rules for generating its elements. The elimination rule is determined by the introduction rules and expresses de nition by primitive recursion on the way the elements of the set are generated. (In this paper I shall use the term primitive recursive for the kind of recursion you have in type theory, which includes primitive recursive functionals and`structural' recursion on an arbitrary inductive (=inductively de ned) set (or family) including trans nite recursion.) Backhouse 3] et.al. 4 ] exhibited a schema for inductive sets which delimits a class of de nitions admissible in Martin-L of's type theory which includes all the standard operations for forming small sets except the equality set. This schema extends Schroeder-Heister's schema for the logical constants 13, 14] to the type-theoretic case, where proof objects are explicitly represented in the theory.
Coquand and Paulin 5] and Dybjer 7 ] extended Backhouse's schema to incorporate inductive families and thus also inductive predicates. (Coquand and Paulin 5] presented their schema as an extension of impredicative higher order logic and the calculus of constructions, but the formal pattern is much the same as the one in Dybjer 7] .) This schema covers all the standard operations for forming small sets including the equality set. It also subsumes Martin-L of's schema for inductive predicates in predicate logic 8] .
In this paper I give a somewhat di erent presentation of the schema. One di erence is that also de nitions of functions by primitive recursion are presented schematically (much like in Martin-L of 9]) rather than by the usual kind of elimination rules. I also separate the presentation of the process of inductive generation of sets and families from the process of introducing parameters (generic polymorphism). Moreover, I present a version of type theory without a logical framework 1 This is a slightly modi ed version of a paper with the same title which appeared in the Proceedings of the First Workshop on Logical Frameworks, Antibes, May 1990. Editors G. Huet and G. Plotkin. The research was partly supported by ESPRIT Basic Research Action \Logical Frameworks" and Styrelsen f or Teknisk Utveckling.
and without an underlying theory of expressions (like in Martin-L of's presentations of type theory before and including the book 10]).
I also show how to interpret type theory, with the schema, in classical set theory. This gives a non-intended but useful interpretation, compare Troelstra 16, page 2]:`The simplest interpretation of ML 0 is in terms of a hierarchy within classical set theory, where , , etc, correspond to the formation of cartesian products, disjoint unions etc. as already indicated above; function, i.e., elements of cartesian products are regarded as equal if for each argument their values are equal, etc.' Salvesen 12] presented details of such an interpretation of type theory. Well-orderings and the rst universe were interpreted as inductively de ned sets obtained by iterations of continuous operators. Coquand and Paulin 5] proposed to give a set-theoretic interpretation of their schema for inductive sets by (i) translating the introduction rules de ning a set to a strictly positive set operator in type theory; (ii) introducing rules for xed points of such set operators in type theory and showing that the corresponding rules of the schema can be derived; (iii) interpreting typetheoretic strictly positive operators as ! n -continuous functors on the category of sets (assuming a theory without universes).
In this paper I use Aczel's 1] notion of rule set rather than continuous functors. It is really only a variation, since a rule set generates a continuous operator. But it allows a direct concrete translation of the type-theoretic introduction rules to set-theoretic rule sets and generalizes the concrete construction of the term algebra T on a rst order signature .
I also interpret inductive families. Even though the interpretation is a non-intended one, there is an analogy with Martin-L of's intuitive justi cations of the rules of type theory, whereby the formation rule receives its meaning from the introduction rules and the elimination rule receives its meaning from the equality rules.
I would also like to mention that Aczel 2] has shown how to interpret certain inductive sets, such as the well-orderings of type theory, in a constructive set theory (which itself can be interpreted in Martin-L of's type theory). Does it follow that the whole of Martin-L of's type theory can be interpreted in this constructive set theory?
Type theory is presented in the following steps. The dependently typed -calculus (section 2). This is like the simply typed -calculus with instead of !. It consists essentially of the general rules and the rules for in Martin-L of 10] except eta-conversion. ( In the present intensional version of type theory of Martin-L of 1986 there is no eta-conversion on the level of sets but only on the level of types.) Schema for inductive sets (section 3). This part of the schema is closely related to the wellorderings. Schema for primitive recursive function de nitions (section 4). Schema for inductive families (section 5). This generalizes the schema for inductive sets. The simpler case is presented separately for the purpose of the presentation only. Schema for primitive recursive families of functions (section 6). This generalizes the schema for primitive recursive functions.
Generic set formers. The fact that a de nition may depend on parameters gives rise to set formers or generic polymorphism (section 7). Typical ambiguity is also discussed brie y, and it is noted that the interpretation allows polymorphic constructors, but not polymorphic recursive functions. Moreover, the possibilty of internalizing the schema is discussed. Universes (section 8). At each step I rst give syntax, then inference rules, and nally a set-theoretic interpretation.
In this paper I don't discuss simultaneous induction and recursion. The reader is referred to Dybjer 7] for this and also for some examples of what can be de ned using the schema.
The dependently typed -calculus
We use ordinary notation, but omit mentioning variable restrictions, etc. 
Expressions

Interpretation of expressions
The basic idea of the interpretation is to interpret a type-theoretic concept as the corresponding set-theoretic concept, which usually has the same name. So a (type-theoretic) set is interpreted as a (set-theoretic) set, an element of a set as an element of a set, (de nitional) equality as extensional equality, (type-theoretic) cartesian product as (set-theoretic) cartesian product, function as function graph, etc. A context is interpreted as a set of assignments.
Let a] ] be the denotation of the expression a under the assignment . This assigns a set to each variable in a nite list of variables which includes all variables which are free in a. Let ; be the empty assignment and let u x abbreviate fhx; uig. Let The interpretation function is partial. Partiality is introduced in the interpretation of application. But the interpretation of a derivable judgement will be de ned and true.
The method with a partial interpretation function has also been used by Streicher for a categorical interpretation of the calculus of constructions 15].
Interpretation of set expressions: 
Soundness of the inference rules
Checking the soundness of the inference rules means checking that the interpretation of the conclusion of a rule is de ned and true whenever the interpretation of the premises are de ned and true.
It is quite straightforward to check the soundness of all the inference rules. As an illustration we show the soundness of the rule of application. The premises are interpreted as 2.5 Telescopes
In the description of the schema below we shall frequently refer to sequences of dependent sets, to sequences (tuples) of elements, and to sequences of typings of elements. De Bruijn has introduced the term telescope for such sequences of dependent sets. Telescopes are closely related to contexts, they are so as to speak contexts treated as objects. Telescopes can also be viewed as obtained by iterating the -construction. It is intended that the reader view the terms telescope, tuple, etc., and certain associated notations as abbreviations and reduce them to formal notions of type theory in a way to be suggested below. (The description is not complete, and sometimes the notation needs to be interpreted with some good will in order to make sense.)
The new notation is explained as follows:
As is a telescope means that A 1 set, : : :; a n = a 0 n : A n a 1 ; : : :; a n?1 ]
respectively.
We also write f(as) for f(a 1 ; : : :; a n ), f(as; bs) for f(a 1 ; : : :; a n ; b 1 ; : : :; b m ), etc.
An alternative approach would be to extend type theory with formal notions of telescopes and tuples. In addition to the standard forms of judgement we would have the new forms As is a telescope; As = As 0 ; as :: As; as = as 0 :: As. As other forms of judgement these judgements would be made under assumptions. We would then have suitable rules for forming telescopes and tuples. Furthermore, if we have telescopes, a context can be viewed as a single assumption xs :: As.
Compare also the discussion in section 7 on internalization of the schema.
The set-theoretic semantics can be extended to telescopes and tuples. When we write us 2 As] ], we understand that us is a tuple hu 1 ; : : :; u n i such that u 1 We also use index notation such as (a k ) k , (A k ) k , and (a k : A k ) k to stand for a 1 ; : : :; a n , A 1 ; : : :; A n , and a 1 : A 1 ; : : :; a n : A n respectively. This will be used, for example, to talk about non-dependent telescopes of the form (A k ) k .
Schema for inductive sets
We have now presented the syntax and rules of the dependently typed -calculus. Call this theory T 0 . T 0 can be extended successively obtaining the theories T 1 ; T 2 ; : : :.
There are two di erent kinds of extensions.
The rst kind is when T n+1 is obtained from T = T n by adding formation and introduction rules for a new set former P (see section 3, 5, and 7).
The second kind is when T n+1 is obtained from T = T n by adding a new function constant f, which is de ned by primitive recursion on some set (or family) and is speci ed by its type and its computation rules (see section 4, 6, and 7). In this way we get schematic elimination and equality rules. We rst treat the simple case without parameters and inductive families.
Expressions
Set expressions:
A 
Inductive sets in set theory
We shall use Aczel's 1] set-theoretic notion of rule set to interpret the introduction rules for a new set former. The set de ned inductively by a rule set is the least set closed under all rules in the rule set.
A rule on a base set U in Aczel's sense is a pair of sets hu; vi, often written u v ; such that u U and v 2 U.
Let be a set of rules on U. A set w is -closed if u v 2 ^u w v 2 w:
There is a least -closed set I( ) = \ fw Ujw ? closedg; the set inductively de ned by . 
Interpretation of expressions
Primitive recursive functions
Functions can be de ned by recursion on the way the elements of P are generated (primitive or structural recursion). Here we give a schema for such de nitions rather than a single elimination rule. 
Syntax
Interpretation of expressions
Since P is deterministic, type-theoretic primitive recursion can be interpreted as set-theoretic primitive recursion on I( P ) and the elimination rule is validated.
To prove the soundness of the equality rules we need to prove three things: two memberships and an equality. The memberships are immediate. The equality is a direct consequence of the de nition of f .
Inductive families
We now treat the more general case of inductively de ned families of sets, but still postpone the discussion of parameters. 
Expressions
Inductive families in set theory
Let I and U be sets and let be a rule set on I U. Then inductively de nes a family IF( ) of sets in U over I by IF( )(i) = fu 2 Ujhi; ui 2 I( )g for each i 2 I.
Interpretation of expressions
Interpretation of set expressions: 6 Primitive recursive families of functions
We give a schema for functions which are de ned by recursion on the way the elements of P(as) are generated. This generalizes the schema in section 4. Note that we have a kind of simultaneous recursion: an element of P(ps i as]) is generated from the elements of (P(qs ik as; zs])) k .
6.1 Syntax 
Primitive recursive families of functions in set theory
The rule set P is still deterministic. As a consequence we could de ne functions on the pairs has; ci in I( P ). But we want curried versions instead. Such functions can be de ned as inductive families of set-theoretic functions. The set-theoretic interpretation extends directly to the case with parameters.
Interpretation of expressions
Typical ambiguity
The set-theoretic interpretation given above is polymorphic (introduces typical ambiguity) in the constructors but not in the recursive functions. This is because the denotation of intro i (as; (b k ) k )
does not depend on the denotations of Gs i , and However, there are no formal means in type theory for introducing W and T , not even in the theory of logical types (Martin-L of's logical framework). It seems that we would need to extend this framework with certain formal notions of telescope and non-dependent list.
Also note that we need the extra generality provided by the schema as compared with the well-orderings, since we consider intensional type theory. In extensional type theory on the other hand, we can use well-orderings for representing inductive sets, see Dybjer 6] . But even so, this is done by non-trivial coding and by assuming some basic set formers such as ?, >, +, and , in addition to , which is needed for the schema too.
For inductive families we could similarly try to write A : U n A set ; A = A 0 : U n A = A 0 : These rules extend the dependently typed -calculus with universes (getting the theory T U 0 ) and are independent of the particular set formers introduced later. As in the case without universes we may extend T U 0 to obtain a sequence of theories T U 1 ; T U 2 ; : : :. When extending T = T U n to T U n+1 by adding a new set former P or a new function constant f we may use the rules for universes to justify that the Gs i , Hs ik xs], etc. are sets. Moreover, for each set former P(ts) which may depends on certain parameters ts (see the previous section) we have universe introduction rules re ecting the formation rule of P. Assume that the de nition of P(ts) involves the telescopes Gs i ts] and Hs ik xs; ts] (see section 3 and 5), and that Gs i ts] : U n and Hs ik xs; ts] : U n (xs :: Gs i ) whenever the set parameters in ts are in U n . Then we get an introduction rule for U n by modifying the conclusion P(ts) set of the formation rule to P(ts) : U n , by modifying each premise for a set parameter A : set to A : U n , and by leaving each premise for an element unchanged. (This situation is somewhat complex and we won't give a completely formal presentation. If we introduce the internal set former for inductive families WF, then it would be easy to let the formation rule of WF be re ected as a universe introduction rule.)
A natural set-theoretic interpretation of the sequence of universes is as a sequence of settheoretic universes. But this would not re ect the fact that a universe in type theory is a set, and thus inductively de ned by its introduction rules. In particular it would not interpret the elimination rule for that universe.
So instead we could make the interpretation dependent on the particular collection of set formers introduced, and let rule sets corresponding to the introduction rules for U n inductively generate U n ] ]. The latter approach is similar to Salvesen's interpretation of the universe 12]. Note however that, provided we have introduced at least one in nite set in U 0 , the requirement that U 0 ] ] is a set implies that there exists a strongly inaccessible cardinal sup u2 U 0 ] ] card u.
